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In 1993 the Naval Postgraduate School with the help of the Air Force Information 
Warfare Facility (AFIWC) in San Antonio, installed MOM in the Modeling and 
Simulation classified laboratory facility in Spanagel Hall. It was intended to support 
student studies on campus and thesis work in the field of Radar and Electronic Warfare. 
The two curriculum that primarily employed this facility were the Electrical and 
Computer Engineering and the Electronic Warfare Curricula. However, with the passage 
of time, there have been additional curriculum that have found this facility of use 
including the Electronic Warfare Department, the Aeronautical Engineering Department, 
and the newly formed Information Warfare Group. The school was excited and pleased to 
have been chosen as a recipient of IMOM, and has since invested well over $100,000 in 
added facilities to properly support the use of MOM for both laboratory instruction and 
research. Use of MOM adds greatly to students’ skill set by helping them apply the 
knowledge learned in class, to actual operating scenarios. Furthermore, when structured 
as a mini-war game, MOM allows teams to pit their knowledge in a real world tactical 
scenario and practice on employing combat tactics both from an offensive and defensive 
position. 
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In recent years several opportunities have arisen for research assignments using 
IMOM as a tool. The most visible of these tasks was the adaptation of the system to 
accommodate the IMOM program code for the EA-6B which was assigned as a 
replacement for the EF-111 when the Navy assumed responsibility for the SEAD role 
from the Air Force. This effort was completed in 1996 and has been working 
satisfactorily since then. The Naval Postgraduate School in it’s role as the DoD’s 
University, stands ready at all times to not only provide education for all of the Services 
(Army, Air Force, and Marines as well as Navy) but to also provide assistance in any area 
of research in which it feels competent, to help a DoD organization. Toward this end, 
when the Information Warfare Group at NPS was approached by a team from VX-9, 
NAWC China Lake and the AFIWC in mid-1997 with a request to assist in analyzing 
field test data taken to calibrate the accuracy of M O M  predictions, the response was a 
resounding “Let’s Go!” 
2. INTRODUCTION 
This report is the second and final document presenting the results of this cooperative 
effort. It analyzes and discusses the results of two days of intensive testing at NAWC 
China Lake on the 9” and 10” of July, 1997. These tests were performed to determine the ’ 
ability of IMOM to be used as a predictive tool when employed in the role of mission 
planning. The genesis of this study was to answer a question that had arisen in 
comparison of field results being obtained from the TAMPS modeling and simulation 
system. It was desired to obtain flight test data for both TAMPS and IMOM in order to 
compare their ability to accurately predict the effects of Radar Terrain Masking (RTM). It 
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Was initially planned to have N P S  compare predictive data from both these systems and 
then do an analysis of how they compared to actual field test data. 
TAMPS 
Shortly into the study, NPS was notified that it was clear that there would be no 
inputs available for analysis from the TAMPS system. This necessitated N P S  having to 
disregard TAMPS in this study and to simply run the IMOM predictive results and 
concentrate on comparing that to “ground truth” determined from the field tests. 
A PowerPoint presentation, prepared by VX-9 in May of 1998, is included 
in this report as Attachment 1 .* 
AFMSS 
It was also initially planned to include the Air Force A F M S S  radar terrain masking 
(RTM) program in this study as well. A more carefid review of the structure of the 
A E M S S  modeling code, however, revealed a feature called “high point.” This particular 
algorithm was designed to move the radar site from the actually plotted position of a 
specific radar, to a position located at the highest altitude within a 1500 meter radius of 
the actual site. This particular feature of the computer program in A F M S S  made the 
program unsuitable for the accuracy comparison required in this study. NPS did not 
examine the AMSS system during the conduct of this study..However, information on 
A F M S S  testing was received from VX-9 and is quoted here: 
* Comments in this font throughout this report represent verbatim inputs from VX-9. 
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AFMSS Test Results 
1. AFMSS testing was performed by AFIWC personnel a San Ananio, TX 
using version 2.0C. The raw data was reported to VX-9 for analysis and 
reporting. 
2. AFMSS displays RTM coverage in a detection line format with a resolution 
of 1 degree by 1 NM based on calculations performed using Level 1 
DTED (3 arc second). The model has an automatic feature called 
"highpoint" which adjusts the elevation of the threat emitter to the highest 
DTED elevation within a 1 NM rectangle of the input coordinates. This 
feature could not be disabled. AFMSS can display overhead and profile 
views of the radar coverage. The AFMSS on which testing was conducted 
did not have a printing capability, so no visual outputs are provided. 
3. Test runs consisted of 5 EO points and 4 FSA points. The data and 
results are as follows: 






































RMS Yo Error: 6.8% 
4. Conclusions: AFMSS was reasonably accurate within the limitations of its 
display resolution (1 NM x 1 degree). In IMOM testing it was found that 
the highpoint feature tended to rotate the detection line envelope about 
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the site while usually not appreciable affecting range or overall shape of 
the envelope. This feature was deemed to be useful for sites where exact 
location is not known, but should be operator selectable and default to off. 
Data on processing speed or ability to fuse multiple envelopes was not 
collected. 
IMOM 
IMOM is a powerful predictive model that allows a mission planner the opportunity 
to select any of a wide variety of adversarial radars, and by using National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency (NIMA) terrain data, locate that radar at a particular latitude and 
longitude. The planner is then free to select a wide range of US aircraft platforms and plot 
their track assuming a hypothetical mission to attack a target within the range of the 
radar’s emissions. The planner is free to choose speed, bearing, and altitude to minimize 
the likelihood of the friendly attacking aircraft being detected by both the enemy’s search 
radar and downed by his fire control radar on the missile or gun system. One very useful 
outcome of this planning procedure is the ability of IMOM to ascertain when and where 
the attacking aircraft when flying in mountainous areas will be terrain masked thereby 
permitting mission planners to select a less risky environment for both approach and 
egress from the target area. 
With the present predictive ability of the GPS system to accurately locate both an 
aircraft’s position and that of the radar, coupled with 3 arc-sec resolution of the NIMA 
terrain database, it has now become possible to analyze this degree of MOM accuracy. 
The field test data was planned around a carefully programmed flight test schedule. The 
recorded field test data compared actual detection results to predicted IMOM horizontal 
direction ray plots, along with IMOM and vertical cross-sectional plots. Display examples 
of each of these plots is shown in Attachment 2. The accuracy of this MOM predictive 
data is of critical importance to the mission planner and the pilot of the attacking aircraft. 
To the best of our knowledge, a chance to perform this calibration and analysis has never 
before presented itself. This opportunity for N P S  to carry out original research in this 
field for the first time was one of the intriguing aspects of this assignment that moved us 
so quickly to sign on for the project. Additional information received form VX-9 is 
presented below. 
1. Model Sophistication. None of the models tested addressed 
anomalous propagation. All used some form of NlMA DTED. TAMPS 
and IMOM allowed the operator to vary DTED sampling interval from 3 
arc second (100 m) to 60 arc second (2000 m) to trade accuracy for 
processing speed. This was deemed to be a desirable feature for 
mission planning where time constraints are common. IMOM and 
AFMSS had a "highpoint" feature which moved the location of a threat 
radar to the highest terrain point within a finite radius around the input 
coordinates. This feature may be useful for cases where the emitter 
location is not precisely known, but actually reduced RTM accuracy for 
the test cases where the location was precisely known. The feature 
may be desirable if it is an option which defaults to off, and can 
selectively be set to on for individual sites. 
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2. IMOM is part of the USAF Contingency Theater Air Planning System 
(CTAPS) and its successor, the Theater Battle Management 
Command System (TBMCS), as well as the unit-level Combat 
Intelligence System (CIS). IMOM is endorsed by the Air Force 
Operational Test and Evaluation Command (AFOTEC) for operation 
testing of AFMSS. 
3. Accuracy. The 3 arc second DTED version of IMOM (ver 3.9) was the 
most accurate of the three systems tested. The 15 arc second version 
of IMOM and AFMSS were roughly comparable and reasonably 
. accurate. TAMPS has gross errors attributed to both database and 
algorithm shortcomings. 
3. IMOMFUNDAMENTALS 
The type of radars normally used for aircraft detection and to control gun and missile 
system fire control systems have RF emissions that are unable to penetrate solid earth. 
Therefore, where a radar is aimed at a low flying incoming target such that the radar 
antenna angle of elevation is low enough to be screened by mountains, it produces a blind 
area, or ‘shadow’ for detection behind these land masses. In this volume of air space, an 
aircraft in flight cannot be detected. The entire process has been given the name “terrain 
masking”, often abbreviated with the acronym RTM (Radar Terrain Masking). The effect 
of this RTM is clearly displayed by MOM when examining the ring display. This ring 
display is a picture of a series of fingers, or lines extending out from the location of the 
radar. The end of each of these fingers represents the longest range that a target can be 
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detected on a specific bearing while at a specifically selected altitude, using the particular 
combination of radar and aircraft chosen in the given scenario. It is based on a 
mathematical solution of the radar range equation (RRE). The RRE is a straight forward 
relationship which takes into account all the physical principals on which a radar system 
is designed. The RRE cannot by itself, however, calculate the effect of terrain masking. 
Therefore, there is another control built into MOM which truncates the length of this 
detection ray based on the interference generated by terrain. The terrain model is that 
provided to IMOM by the NIMA standard program. That is one of the strengths of 
MOM, the ability to predict RTM in a combat scenario. The question that we have 
designed this study to assess, is the accuracy of this prediction. Additional information 
from VX-9 is presented below: 
1. Detection Line vs. Rays. The detection line display is more useful for 
mission planning purposes because of display clutter inherent with 
rays and need to simultaneously display other data like waypoints, 
targets, surface order of battle, imagery, ,etc. TAMPS and AFMSS 
display detection lines. IMOM defaults to "rings" (more appropriately 
labeled "rays") but has a detection line option. The IMOM detection 
line seems to trace a line just beyond the end of the rays rather than 
connecting their end points. 
2. Display of Multiple Envelopes. The IMOM ability to fuse multiple 
detection line envelopes into a single collective detection line envelope 
for each of two classes of system (detection and threat) further 
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reduced clutter and greatly simplified mission planning. This should be 
the default display if multiple threat sites are selected. 
4. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
a. System Physical Arrangements 
The initial plan was to fly three different aircraft types, two fixed wing and one helo, 
along predetermined flight paths at low level through the mountainous terrain located on 




(3) AH-1W - helicopter 
FA- 18, equipped with a GPS tracking pod - fixed wing 
EA-6B equipped with a GPS tracking pod - fixed wing 
These targets would be observed by four NIKE tracker radars located at three 
different sites on the range. These radars were designated: 




The aircraft flight paths would place them alternately within radar visibility and then, 
although still within radar range, cause them to be hidden by terrain masking. It was 
intended that these runs would be tracked optically as well as using a low power I-band 
RF line-of-sight marker beacon aboard the EA-6B, which would provide a backup 
indication on a Frequency Spectrum Analyzer (FSA) at the J-1E-12 NATO site, along 
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with visual LDS sighting through a telescope (recorded on video tape from each site). The 
very low power I-band signal was intended to simply provide one way propagation 
information rather than jam the ground radars, and it was deconflicted with all ground 
radars before the tests were run. Thus, when the radar signal from a particular site 




OpticaYvisual observation (video recorded with time tic) 
Receipt of RF beacon signal on FSA (recorded with time tic) 
Observation of the target on the radar CRT screen 
The raw data collected included radar track acquisition and radar drop track times as 
well as continuous three dimensional aircraft time-space-position information (TSPI) data 
from GPS or NIKE at one second intervals. Also, A-scope and B-scope video was taken 
of the A-2, E-12, and J-17 sites as well as optics video from the 1-5, 5-17, 5-12 of the 
N K E  trackers as well as audio for all ground and aircraft operators. The data set of 
approximately 250 points was sent in EXCEL format spreadsheet to NPS. It represents all 
the points that NAWC was able to positively verify that radar acquisition or drop track 
was related to terrain masking. 
The data supplied by NAWC for this RTM analysis was collected during two 2-hour 
periods between 0900 and 1100 on the 9* and 10* of July, 1997. After the field tests 
were completed and during the initial period of data analysis, it was realized that there 
was an inherent built-in variable time error present if one were to use the man-in-the-loop 
input for determining when a target emerged from (or entered into) the shadow of a 
mountain due to terrain masking. Therefore, it was concluded that the only reliable 
indicator of LOS contact between the radar and the moving target was the receipt by the 
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radar site of the I-band signal that was being generated by the low power jamming pod on 
the EA-6B. Since the EA-6B was the only platform to have this pod, the decision was 
agreed to by both NAWC and NPS to use this combination of I-band signal and its 
appearance on the FSA at the radar site, as the only dependable signal for accurately 
measuring the time tic of when these RTM events occurred. With the time then accurately 
fixed on both the radar site and the aircraft, these RTM events could be accurately 
plotted. This procedure is more fully explained in the next section of the report. As events 
turned out, because of a failure of the GPS pod on the EA-6B to operate properly during 
the first days runs, all data from the July 9* flight test was eliminated from this study. 
Editorial inputs from VX-9 follow. 
TSPl Anomalies. Several points in the flight database plotted well inside 
the detection line envelopes of IMOM and AFMSS. Upon further analysis 
of the raw time-space-position information (TSPI) data streams, the 















A/C in climb 
A/C in climb 
A/C in climb 
A/C in climb 
A/C in climb 
A/C maneuvering (beginning descent) 
A/C maneuvering (leveling from descent) 
RTM for 7k, A/C at 2K 
RTM for 7k, A/C at 2K 
TSPl error wrong A/C (no TSPI available for EA-6B) 
TSPI error wrong A/C (no TSPl available for EA-6B) 
TSPl error wrong A/C (no TSPl available for EA-6B) 
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It was found that the aircraft flight path for each of the first five cases was 
a steep climb from a masked region into the unmasked region (aircraft 
was resetting from the end of one data run to begin the next). Thus these 
are valid "popup" target points, but reflect some delays in detection due to 
aircraft maneuvering. Aircraft maneuvering also affected points 6 and 7. 
The FSA collected energy from an EA-6B J band jamming pod 
(essentially a high power, directional beacon). The pod antenna is only 
stabilized in two dimensions, and may not be able to point toward a 
ground site while the aircraft is in steep climbs or descents, or while the 
aircraft is maneuvering aggressively. Points 8 and 9 were valid, but the 
IMOM plots were done at the wrong altitude. Agreement should be better 
if replotted for an aircraft at 2000' AGL vice 7000' AGL. Points 10-12 had 
TSPI from the wrong aircraft. Data for the EA-6B was not available for 
these times. VX-9 recommends we remove points 1-7 and 10-12 from the 
database. Points 8 and 9 are valid and should remain. 
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b. Raw Data Screening 
As the testing progressed at NAWC, it sOon became apparent that using the recorded 
time of the operator sighting the target by observation of that target on the radar CRT, 
was not going to be a workable technique. The problem that arose was tied to the fact that 
there was a finite time required (somewhere between 6 to 8 seconds) for the radar antenna 
to rotate through one complete revolution. If the target a/c flew out of a RTM position at 
a time immediately after the sweep passed on the particular bearing angle of the target, 
then this fact would not be detected by the man-in-the-loop observing the signal on the 
CRT until up to 8 seconds later in time. With the nearness of the targets in range, and 
their high rate of speed, this lag could introduce an enormous error in the human 
observations with the “truth” of the situation. This would have of course provided an 
inaccurate picture of reality. The IMOM model assumed a non-rotating antenna. Further, 
it was impossible to coordinate the sweeps of the real antenna to avoid this variable man- 
in-the-loop delay. 
Given this realization, it was determined that the only data that could be confidently 
used to provide the reality desired in the test, was the time at which the FSA signal 
appeared (or disappeared) and was confirmed by optical confirmations of the slaved video 
recording that optical confirmation, at the same time tic as the FSA readings. This 
screening process was then applied to about 85 sets of data runs, resulting initially in 
about 40 sets of acceptable raw data runs. 
Prior to this process, of the thousands of acquisition and drop track events also 
initially reviewed by NAWC, it was determined that most were related to slew rate or 
clutter rather than terrain masking and therefore NAWC eliminated this data from earlier 
consideration. At that time the remaining points which NAWC determined to be valid 
were confirmed to be terrain impacted events by viewing tagged videos of the various 
optical systems co-located with emitters of interest, while at the same time observing 
terrain impacting of the optical line of sight. The radar track data was not directly 
correlated to which aircraft was being tracked. Consequently, NAWC had to perform this 
correlation manually by reviewing video tapes to identify the target either visually or by 
run number and azimuth. NAWC then faxed 37 pages of vertical profile data to NPS for 
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analysis. These 40 runs represented what they thought were the most revelant cases of 
acquisition or -drop track near or beyond the optical line of sight. NAWC made the 
determination as explained above, that at the conclusion of data screening, the only 
reliable and useful data was that received from the EA-6B platform. Consequently, data 
from the remaining two aircraft were not analyzed by NPS. Additional inputs from VX-9 
are included below: 
(1) PHYSICAL TEST ELEMENTS. Three different aircraft were used for test: 
two fixed wing (FA-18, €A-GB), and one rotary wing (AH-1W). These 
targets were tracked by two actual threat SAM radar systems (J-17, M), 
two actual threat surveillance radar systems (A-2, E-12), one threat gun 
radar simulator (J-1), and a frequency spectrum analyzer (FSA) each with 
co-located optical camera systems. In addition, three Nike tracking radars 
provided three-dimensional time-space-position information (TSPI) data 
for the AH-1 helicopter, and for the EA-6B during the first day when its 
GPS pod failed. The test range layout and location of the various threat 
systems is depicted in Attachment 1. 
The aircraft flight paths were designed to ensure periods of masking 
and tracking for each system and passed over two prominent surveyed 
terrain features: Slate Peak to the northwest, and Pilot Knob to the west 
(see Attachment 1). The aircraft flight paths are shown in Attachment 1. 
The EA-6B was configured with a J-band jamming pod steered to 
always radiate directionally toward the FSA. This signal was specifically 
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tailored so as not to interfere with any of the tracking systems, but rather 
to function as a high power directional beacon for the FSA to determine 
when RF energy could be seen by the ground-based receiver. The FSA 
receiver was omni-directional. 
(2) RAW DATA. The raw data collected included: 
TSPl data for each aircraft at 1 second intervals 
Time tagged video of weapon radar and FSA displays 
Time tagged video of all weapon optics 
Time audio recording of radar operator voice network including acquisition 
and drop track calls 
The desired set of data was the unmask (ACQ) and mask (DRP) points 
for all aircraft at various altitudes for each system. The set of these points 
would be used to define the empirical boundaries of the actual RTM 
envelope for each site, and would be used as truth data by which to 
evaluate the three models. ACQ and DRP events were manually 
correlated to associated optics video to discriminate only those events 
positively associated with terrain masking (Le., eliminate tracking 
problems from clutter, slew rate, operator confusion, etc.). All surviving 
ACQ and DRP events (-250) were entered into a spreadsheet, and also 
into TAMPS as three-dimensional route points. 
(1) INITIAL ANALYSIS AND DATA FILTERING. TAMPS vertical profile 
function (Attachment 1) was used to view the terrain between the aircraft 
and the ground site for each data point to get a first cut at how the point 
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compared to optical LOS. In this initial analysis several observations were 
made: 
1. The radar line of sight for the tracking radars associated with J-17 and 1-5 
was near indiscemable from the optical line of sight. All radar ACQ points 
occurred coincident with or just after optical LOS was observed through 
the associated weapon optics. Most DRP points were coincident with 
optical masking, and none extended more than 1 second beyond the point 
where the aircraft was visually observed to be masked. These data points, 
which were the most numerous collected, seem to indicate that an optical 
line of sight is a better approximation of the realistic engagement 
envelope of tracking and missile guidance radars. This finding is not 
surprising when considering their narrow field of view, requirements for 
precision cueing for acquisition, and need to maintain a high data update 
rate. Since these points were virtually indistinguishable from the optical 
LOS, they were not used toward resolving the accuracy of the radar range 
equations (RRE) used by the three models which each assume radar 
refraction effects beyond the optical LOS. 
2. The ACQ and DRP points for the surveillance radars (A-2 and E-12) fell 
well inside the modeled RTM envelopes, and usually within the optical 
LOS as well. The surveillance radars used in this test were older 
generation systems with 6-1 0 second circular scan periods and operator 
displays which required extensive manual interpretation. The delays 
introduced by the scan period and operator recognition of tracks probably 
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explain these results. These points remained in the spreadsheet 
database, but are probably not indicative of the capabilities of newer 
generation EW/GCI/ACQ radars, and were not used in this study. 
3. It soon became apparent that the most promising system for finding points 
out to the classic radar LOS was the FSA. Initial investigation using the 
TAMPS vertical profile tool proved this out. Thirty-seven FSA ACQ and 
DRP points were identified as near or beyond optical LOS, and were 
highlighted for use by all the test teams against the TAMPS, AFMSS,' and 
IMOM model predictions. These results are the subject of the balance of 
this report. 
a. IMOM Accuracy Determination Procedure 
Once a track passed the screening for reliability of field test crdta and passec on to 
NPS, the true latitude and longitude of the a/c radar track acquisition (or drop) point was 
established and plotted. An MOM simulation was then run at N P S  using the 
characteristics of a typical generic search radar which was taken to be located at the 
Lat/Long location of the actual test site radar. The target for this IMOM analysis was 
assumed to be one with a fixed RCS of 10 quare meters on the actual flight path of the 
target. The resulting MOM rings display would then be examined and superimposed on 
the same plot as that previously showing the target location determined with the radar 
data. That single ray of the MOM plot on the bearing of the Lat/Long position of the a/c 
would be highlighted. The end of the rays' length (for maximum range of detection) 
would be marked on the plot and the Lat/Long recorded. 
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, The distance between the two plotted points, the point where the target was first 
detected (or dropped) by the radar, and the second point where IMOM predicted this 
would occur, was compared. This distance was defined as the IMOM “error”, assuming 
that the actual field test data for this Occurrence was “truth”. This information is 
summarized and presented in Table 1. 
5. SUMMARY OF DATA COMPARISON 
Choosing the runs where the confidence level was high enough that all systems in the test 
range were operating satisfactorily, an outline of the analytical steps taken by NPS is 
summarized below: 
a. Establish the time the FSA equipment at the radar site received the J-band signal 
from the EA-6B that was in view. 
b. Confirm the validity of this sighting by examining videos of the optical receiver at 
that site at that time. 
c. Run the MOM printout for a radar at the Lat/Long of the chosen site and printout 
two displays: ring display and vertical beam display. 
d. The inputs to the MOM run consist of: 
1) Radar site location 
2) Characteristics of generic search radar 
3) a/c RCS of 10 square meters 
4) Terrain resolution 3 arc-seconds 
18 















Reference Signal Cut-Off 
' Location 
Actual 
Lat - Long 
(All "N") (ALL 'W") 
161 129 360409 
1165120 
161315 360254 
** Error - Aircraft in Climb 
1 165442 
161405 360703 











164025 352318 , 
1170301 







































































N 165920 352352 7.6 7.6 0 0 
1171309 
0 170245 3538 12 17.1 16.2 0.9 6% 
1171032 
P 170333 353938 20.9 21.9 1 .o 5% 
1170523 
** Error - Aircraft in Climb 
Q 170606 352716 20.4 20.4 0 0 
1 165744 
R 170633 352508 21.3 21.3 0.5 2.5% 
1165625 
S 17073 1 352120 21.2 21.2 0 0 
1165640 












17085 1 352556 21.6 21.6 0 
1165604 
171156 352352 7.3 7.5 0.2 
1171327 
171210 352349 5.7 5.5 0.2 
1171529 
171226 352349 3.6 3.6 0 
1171759 
171506 353740 16.5 16.5 0 
** If you connect the two rings at 34 degs and 35 degs, target on the mark 
1171057 
171606 353918 21.3 21.3 * 
** Error - Aircraft in Climb 
1170417 
171624 353756 20.6 20.6 * 
** Error - Aircraft Maneuvering (Beginning Descent) 
1 17034 1 
171734 353244 19.7 19.7 * 
** Error - Aircraft Maneuvering 
1 170052 
171757 353100 19.7 19.7 0.5 
1165952 












































** Error - Wrong Aircraft 
174222 353854 
1170410 













































Actual = Point of RadarDMOM Site to transition Location 
Comparison determined from measurements on Fig. numbers 1 & 2 
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e. Prepare a superimposed Lat/Long plot on the IMOM ray plot of the radar site 
location and the location of the FSA indicated acquisition (or drop) point.Select the 
MOM ray on the bearing from the radar site to the d c  target. 
f. Determine the ‘end’ of that ray, indicating the range at which the target should 
appear (or disappear). 
g. Plot the Lat/Long of the end of that ray. 
h. Measure the linear distance from the point plotted in e to that plotted in g. 
This linear distance is then considered the “error” of the IMOM predictive algorithm. 
6. ACCURACY ANOMALY ON JULY 10 
An unusual anomaly appeared in the results from the last 15 runs on the July 10* field 
test. The accuracy analysis summary of the field test results under consideration are 
pictured in Table 1. In particular, attention is focused on the results of the last 15 runs 
toward the end of the day. We note that in the first 25 runs of the day, there was an 
average error of about 2%, with only one even approaching a 10% error. Then the next 
three runs had an error in excess of 100%. This bimodal distribution continued until the 
end of the last 15 runs, with the ‘better’ runs having an error distribution much like the 
first 25. 
This appears to be an illogical pattern indicating that perhaps there was something 
else coming into play in these last 15 runs that was not present in the earlier 25 runs. It 
could be hypothesized that some test equipment failure may have been introduced 
unexpectedly into the tests that resulted in the sudden ‘out of the ballpark’ results. In fact, 
in looking at the GPS pod problems that forced the rejection of the entire first days data, 
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it is believed that these problems may have begun to appear late in the second days test 
sequence, causing the errant behavior in test results. 
7. RELATED TOPICS 
a. Earth 4/3 Radius Assumption 
In order to simplify the conceptual plotting of information in line of sight radar 
predictions, engineers often approach the mathematical modeling of the propagation of 
radar waves over the earth’s surface by applying certain simplifications. One of these very 
commonly used procedures, called the “4/3 earth approximation” has been incorporated 
in the MOM computer code. During the course of this study, the question arose as to 
whether or not the printed data displayed by IMOM is equivalent to the results that would 
have been obtained by having calculated direction ranges using simply basic theory of 
propagation models. 
Wave propagation of radar transmission over the earth’s surface can be approached 
by imagining the earth to be an ideally smooth sphere. Then the straight line from a point 
at a height h above the earth is tangent to the earth’s surface as illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Tangent line. 
The distance d to the tangent point is one side of a right triangle, and its length is 
calculated from the equation 
d 2  = ( R , + h ) ' - R ;  
from which d can be solved for 
d = (2R,h + h2 1'' ( 2 )  
If the height h is very small compared to R, (with R, being the earth's radius) this 
approximation is always the case and then d can be found by simplifying Equation (2 )  to 
d = (2R,hy'* (3) 
Substituting the earth's radius as 21 x lo6 feet, and expressing h in feet and d in nautical 
miles (NM), then this equation simplifies to 
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d = 1.07h”2 (4) 
This is the distance to the tangent point from a position h feet above the surface of a 
perfectly round earth. The distance d,, to a farther point along this tangent line at height h, 
above the earth’s surface can be determined by adding a second term, as shown below: 
d, = 1.07(h’’2 + h:’*) (5) 
The radar line of sight distance differs only in the bending of radar waves over the earth’s 
surface. This bending extends the radar horizon, just as optical wave bending extends the 
optical horizon. A commonly accepted way to account for this increase radar line of sight 
is to increase the earth’s radius in the above equation by a factor of 4/3rds. Making this 
change, and using ha to represent the radar antenna’s height, the radar line sight then 
becomes: 
Radar LOS = 1.23(h:’* + (6) 
This is the basic equation to estimate radar line of sight in NM for any antenna or target 
height in feet. Note that if both heights are expressed in meters, the constant changes from 
1.23 to 2.23 with LOS still measured in NM. .Furthermore, in diagramming these 
relationships one can now represent the earth as a flat surface rather than a small portion 
of a sphere, thus simplifying the conceptual aspects to the problem. 
The earth “mask” therefore, can now be considered to be at the radar line of sight. 
Any target beyond this radar LOS will be assumed to be outside the radar coverage. 
Masking around a radar on a perfectly round earth would show as a circle of radius LOS, 





To confirm whether this theory is in agreement with the predictions that M O M  
provides, a simple series of IMOM plots were run and the maximum radar detection 
range was then determined by measuring the length of the M O M  plotted rays. These 
values were then compared with similarly calculated values derived from substitutions 
into the basic Equation (6) from above. 
Masked Masked 
Figure 2: Masking for a perfectly round earth. 
The IMOM radar was chosen as one electronically generic to the types located in sites 
J-1E-12, A-2, 1-5, and 5-17. A platform target with an RCS of 10 square miles was 
selected and placed at three selected altitudes: 500 feet, SO00 feet, and 10,OOO feet. The 
resulting comparison table is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Platform Altitude Range of Detection 
(feet) calculated from IMOM plot 
500 31.95 NM 32.0 NM 
5000 91.42 NM 91.4 NM 
10,000 127.45 NM 127.5 NM 
The MOM ray and vertical beam plots used to measure these values are shown in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively, in the attachments. These results do indeed confirm 
that the MOM program does agree with the 4/3 earth theory predictions derived from the 
basic equations. 
b. IMOM Defense Mapping Terrain Resolution 
There are two possible terrain resolutions, 3-arc second and 15 arc-second, that can be 
selected when employing the DMA terrain data in MOM plots. NPS experimented with 
using both resolutions. From a running time to obtain a solution point of view, there is no 
question that the 15 arc-second is faster. IMOM could calculate a ring display in less than 
a minute using 15 arc-second inputs, while it took on average nine minutes to calculate a 
ring display in 3 arc-second data. In both cases a SUN SPARC 10 workstation was 
employed with an 80 MHz processor (of course if a 300 MHz processor had been used, 
there would have been a considerable saving in run time). 
However, this angular resolution difference when translated into ground truth 
measurements was considerable. A 3 arc-second resolution yields a 300 foot ground 
resolution, while the 15 arc-second resolution degrades to a 1500 foot view. This 
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difference was considered too great to allow us to select the choice which offered the 
most convenient (shorter) time when one considers that entire mountain tops at China 
Lake can be missed within a distance of 1500 feet. So, despite the longer run times 
required, all data used in this study employed the 3 arc-second DMA terrain data. 
c. Generic IMOM Radar Selection 
Since the IMOM plots required the input of the electrical characteristics of a 
specific radar, and our test set up on the ground used four separate radars, N P S  chose to 
use a composite radar of a generic nature, that was then fed into IMOM for the purposes 
of producing predicted results. The specifications of this generic system were based on a 
typical high power value of 270 kilowats, good receiver minimum detectable signal 
capability of -100 dBm, and with an antenna pattern.having beam elevations ranging 
from 2 to 83 degrees from the horizontal. 
It should be kept in mind that the latitude and longitude determination of all aircraft 
platforms at the time of either track acquisition or track drop, were actually determined by 
the signals either received or dropped from the frequency spectrum analyzer (FSA) at the 
radar site. This receiver was being employed (with visual detection back-up confirmed 
from the recorded videos) as an LOS detector of transmissions from the J-band 
transmitter pod on the EA-6B platform. So in no case were these target locations based on 
responses from any of the radars being used during the tests. 
28 
Figure 3: Ray plot, 32.0 NM. 
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Figure 3: Ray plot, 9 1.4 NM. 
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@ 5000 FT at 91.4 nm and * 10000:.FT at 127.5 run 
Figure 4: Vertical plot, 5000 ft at 91.4 NM and 10,000 ft at 127.5 NM. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Taking into account the anomaly of the July 10* data as was described in Section 6 ,  we 
can calculate the total average error of the IMOM results compared to field test results 
from several points of view. We can, for example as choice [a], first employ all the data 
gathered from all 40 runs. Secondly, as choice [b] we can break the data down into two 
different categories. First, simply using all the data with no regard to any judgement on 
the quality of the data. Or second, we can apply some judgement to the data based on 
what appears to be an anomaly found in the test process, which appears to be not 
attributable to the performance of the predictive ability of the MOM program. With these 
possible logical choices for analysis (examining Figure 5 )  we find of the second choice in 
[b] the results to be: 32 data points = 2.38% average error. The eight points that 
resulted in readings with errors in excess of 100% were so far from any reasonable reality 
in fact, that it was deemed highly probable that these errors were caused by some problem 
unrelated to the IMOM model calculations. These errors could have resulted from 
possibly (but not exclusively) a GPS malfunction (again), or an error in the translation of 
data between the various platforms and the test sites. It is the considered opinion of the 
N P S  research team that the most probable ability of the IMOM modeling system in 
predicting the affects of RTM in a mission planning scenario is best represented by the 
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Test Range Setup 
Flight Test Data 
- Collection, Filtering 
TAMPS Products/Problems 
- RTM, Vertical Profile 
0 b ject ives 
Validate accuracy and utility of TAMPS, 
IMOM, and AFMSS RTM models 
Examine accuracy of 4 3  Earth radius LOS 
equations 
Explore differences in LOS for passive vs. 
active detection (one way vs. two way 
pro pagat ion) 
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201 1201 
Data Run Ground Tracks 
- Track flown 
exclusively by EA-6B 
- Track flown by EA- 
6B, FA-18, and AH- 
1 W (CW and CCW 
directions) 
- Hover operating 
area for AH-I W 
Data Collection/Filtering 
- High precision 3D location data (lat/long/alt) at for FA-I8 and EA-6B from fully 
encrypted GPS telemetry pods on A/C. (EA-6B pod worked only on 7/10/97) 
- High precision 3D location data for AH-1 W from Nike tracking radars. 
- Threat systems and frequency spectrum analyzer (FSA) acquisition (ACQ) 
and drop track (DRP) times deduced from time-tagged operator voice audio, 
scope video, and weapon optics video. 
- All data correlated to nearest second in time. 
.P * 
- ACQ and DRP events manually correlated to associated optics video to 
discriminate only those events positively associated with terrain masking (i.e., 
eliminate tracking problems from clutter, slew rate, operator confusion, etc.) 
- All surviving ACQ and DRP events (-250) entered into Excel spreadsheet and 
also into TAMPS as 3D route points. 
- TAMPS vertical profile function used to cull out 37 “interesting” points which 
appeared to be at or beyond optical LOS. 
- Excel spreadsheet and 37 vertical profiles distributed to NPS and AFIWC. 
TAMPS Vertical Profile 
- DTED slice along 
azimuth between 
site and aircraft 
- Used to determine 
terrain elevation and 
downrange distance 
of obstructing point 
(cross hai r) 
- Plot does not 
reflect curvature of 
Earth 
- 37 data points 
chosen for further 
analysis based on 
this plot indicating 
near or beyond 
optical LOS 
TAMPS RTMs 
- Circles are plots of 
actual aircraft 
location when 
acquired or dropped 
- Circles in white are 
points where aircraft 
was detected at 
7200' MSL. 
c- m 
- TAMPS RTM 
unmask envelope for 
A-2 at 7200' MSL is 
displayed as a 
detection line 
7* 10-97 (preferred over rays). H j  ga'~ W S  i- 
Flight Test Data vs. TAMPS 
This plot of E-12 data 
as well as the 
previous slide reflect 
TAMPS’ consistent 
pattern of depicting 
unmasking ranges 
well beyond those 
observed in flight 
testing for all 
systems. Disparities 
as great as 300% 
were observed and 
led to early decision 
to shift analysis effort 
to IMOM and 
AFMSS. 
Other TAMPS Anomalies 





zero, as stylized 
octagons instead 
of circles. This 
was another 




- Ranges were 
also still 30-35% 
longer than 4/3 
earth radius LOS 
ATTACHMENT 2 
Terrain Masking Plots 
FIG. A-l  
5nm 
4 7 . 3  nm @ 37.3' True 
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